Admiral Chester W Nimitz's Strategic Leadership During World War 2 by CDR David J. Jerabek

Author:CDR David J. Jerabek
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2014-07-31T00:00:00+00:00

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES

I consider the technical competencies to be more applicable to today’s national strategic-level leaders than to a WW II warfighting CINC. I will therefore give little emphasis to them, with the exception of the leader’s ability to perform in a joint and combined environment.

At the outbreak of World War II, Admiral Nimitz, then the Chief of Naval Personnel, had his only opportunity to operate in the national political arena. In that capacity he was very effective “on the hill” obtaining congressional approval of the measures he needed to man a wartime Navy.{64} As a theater CINC – during wartime, Admiral Nimitz did not have the opportunity, nor was it his place, to become involved in national level political issues. He was though, very effective at utilizing Admiral King, and if necessary Secretary Knox, to bring strategic or programmatic issues to the appropriate light, that required approval outside his chain of command. Nimitz also used Admiral King’s relationship and access to General Marshall when he encountered inter-service difficulties within the “dual-commanded” Pacific theater.{65}

As previously mentioned, Nimitz was extremely demanding of his commanders and kept only the best to be on his “first team.”{66} And Nimitz demanded jointness from his commanders. Prior to the Tarawa campaign, Nimitz called together his senior commanders – Navy, Army, and Marine – and communicated the importance of jointness for the operation; “If I hear one case of a naval officer not giving required help to the Army ashore, I will immediately relieve him.”{67} No questions were asked.

As the war progressed, and his theater got more “joint”, Nimitz made two major changes to accommodate. In the summer of 1943, Nimitz needed an improvement to his current supply system which couldn’t contend with the growing complexity and expanse of the Pacific theater.{68} Nimitz saw the advantages of the Army system of supply, with its, as Hoyt puts it, “constant infusion of supply, and a planning and delivery network as complex as the fighting system itself”{69} – and adopted it. In September 1943, he set up a true joint theater headquarters at Pearl Harbor that initially had four directorates; Plans (J-1), Intelligence (J-2), Operations (J-3), and Logistics (J-4).{70}

With the Pacific being secondary to Europe as a theater of war, there was little, or no, occasion to operate combined. But when the opportunity presented itself Nimitz was eager, as well as effective. During planning for the Guadalcanal campaign, Admiral Nimitz saw an opportunity to utilize New Zealand troops. When he questioned Admiral Ghormley (3rd Fleet Commander at that time and in charge of the operation) about the possibility, Ghormley could only provide negatives. Nimitz responded, “If we can’t find a formula for using them, it is Japan’s gain. We should use all resources that are available to us.”{71} Throughout the brief Ghormley’s pessimism persisted, causing Nimitz to close the meeting by emphasizing, “I repeat again – if we can’t use our allies, we are damned fools.”{72} As I’ve already mentioned, Admiral Ghormley wasn’t around for the end of the Guadalcanal campaign.

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